Hebraic versus Hellenistic Thinking – Contours of Thought

ON A DAY TO DAY BASIS, WE DO NOT THINK MUCH ABOUT OUR THINKING.

However, whether we realize it or not, our thinking is shaped and influenced by the particular contour of thought that we adopt. Our way of thinking, whether in a Hebraic or Hellenic way will either bring light to or colour our understanding of the things around us, God’s world as well as His Word.

The following article by Richard Niebuhr looks the contours of thought  in context of the self and history but it has implications for our economics and politics too. Niebuhr’s article is rather scholarly and not the easiest to read but there are a few gems there worth the find.

Short Excerpts from Richard Niebuhr’s Writings

“Rationalists of all ages of Western history have regarded the rigorous monotheism of the Hebraic prophets as inferior to this philosophical monism. But they did not observe that the God of the prophets convicted all particular forces in history, including the “elect” nation and its “rulers” and “princes,” of violating the divine command of justice while the Greek philosophers were complacent about the social realities of the Greek city-state and lived under the illusion that the rulers were the instruments of justice because they possessed a higher measure of mind, in short, the contingent character of all social achievements was discerned by prophetism and obscured by even the most sophisticated Greek philosophy. The God of the prophets made judgements which left even the elect nation uneasy. The God of Aristotle was a universal mind with which the mind of the philosopher claimed a complacent identity. So the tension between the finite self and the divine self was obscured.

The contrast between the two forms of monotheism was revealed even more clearly in their attitudes toward the “rulers” of their respective civilizations. The prophets were severely critical of the rulers or “elders” of Israel. Their criticism was directed at their pride and injustice. (“They turn aside the needy at the gate,” declared Amos; and Isaiah charged that of the poor is in their houses.) This happened to be an accurate description of the actual behavior of ruling groups throughout the ages.

In contract we have both Plato’s and Aristotle’s complacent acceptance of the aristocratic structure of Hellenic society, and Aristotle’s conviction that some men were “by nature'” slaves. The basis of this conviction was clearly their confidence in the “reason” of the “guardians” as a source of justice and as the agent of order in the polis. Ignorant men would strive for immediate ends, but the “philosophers” would with superior intelligence strive for more inclusive ends and thus create a political order which would imitate the cosmic order created by the divine mind. The provisional truth in this assessment of the human situation lies in the fact that some men excel others in the rational comprehension of the forces and factors which are involved in any political situation. These are the potential rulers in a community. But their superior rational endowment guarantees nothing in regard to the justice with which they will wield their power or exercise their eminence. The basic fallacy of the Greek philosophers was to regard the rational faculty as the source of virtue. This error was partly due to their failure to recognize the ability of the self to use its reason for its own ends… Nevertheless the Greek tradition is still preferred to the Hebraic because it displays a neater coherence of the world of the self and the world, and of the self and God. For the world, the self and God are all contained within the continuities of “reason.” ….

The Self and the Dramas of History
by Reinhold Niebuhr

The Hebraic and the Hellenic Approaches to the Problem of Selfhood and History, Chapter 13

We have sought to interpret the unique character of human selfhood without particular references to the presuppositions which governed the inquiry except the frequent references to the misunderstanding of the self which was occasioned by the identification of the self with mind. This had an obvious origin in Greek philosophy and has persisted through the whole course of our Western civilization. Our analysis of presuppositions became more explicit as we finally turned to the examination of the religious dimension of self-awareness and found that a rationalistic approach to the problems of the self easily leads to a mystic one. There is a path not only from Plato to Aristotle, but from Plato to Plotinus in the history of Greek culture. And both Aristotle and Plotinus fail to understand the self in its wholeness, its uniqueness, its particularity, and in its involvement in the dramatic realities of history.

The simple fact is that the same Greek component in our culture which is responsible for laying the foundations of all our philosophy and sciences and is celebrated by every intelligent person as the fountain and source of what is “enlightened” in our history is also responsible for all our most serious misunderstandings about man and his history. These misunderstandings have two sources in Greek rationalism. The one is the failure to distinguish between the self and its mind, resulting in the illusion that the true self is mind, subordinating the passions to rational control. The other is that the history, which the self elaborates and in which it is involved, proceeds on a “rational,” that is to say an ontological, pattern. The drama in history is obscured by the alleged ontological framework of history. For “ontology” means the science of being. A science of being, to be distinguished from the particular sciences which analyze the structure of particular beings, seems confronted with the alternatives which Aristotle and Plotinus adumbrated. Either being is defined as an essential structure which is represented as the final cause, determining all processes of actualization; or being is described as an undifferentiated “ground” of all particular realities from which they emanate. In either case, the ontological analysis of selfhood and of history is productive of error. Historical drama is equated with natural occurrence by Aristotle because the forms and structures determine actualization as much in the historical, as in the natural, scene. History, on the other hand, is made meaningless by Plotinus. It is merely an emanation from an eternal ground, and its actions have no significance. Aristotle can not find the particular self. The self’s mind is identical with a universal mind. Plotinus also seeks emancipation from particular selfhood, not however by rational but by mystic means, that is, by extricating universal consciousness rather than universal mind from particular selfhood.

Modern ideas of a temporal process have altered these alternatives somewhat. But they have not succeeded in giving the self or its dramas any real significance.

There is no doubt, on the other hand, about the wholeness of the self in its finiteness and freedom, about the height of that freedom above the limits of formal reason, about the dramatic reality of history, and about the distance and the relation of God to that drama, in the culture of the Hebrews, which furnishes the other component of our Western civilization, and which is embodied in the Bible. It is commonly asserted that we have our religion, and possibly our ethics, from the Hebraic side, and our philosophy from the Hellenic side, of our heritage. This generalization is, broadly speaking, correct, but it does not point accurately to the peculiar virtues and defects of each part of our heritage. It does not do justice to the fact that there is a yearning after the ultimate in the Hellenic, as in the Hebraic culture; and that there are ethical and religious concepts in both. But the Hellenic is defective in understanding the self and its dramas because it tries to understand both rationally and ontologically. The Hebraic, on the other hand, is defective in analyzing any permanent structure in the flow of temporal events. For the one history is made into another dimension of nature; and for the other nature is subsumed under history. Both nature and history are understood as standing under a divine sovereignty, rather than as subject to self-explanatory laws. Thus the one culture misunderstands human selves and their history, where freedom is more apparent than laws. The other misunderstands nature because it is primarily to be understood in terms of analyzable laws.

The Hellenic heritage has been so serviceable in our understanding and “conquest” of nature and has won such increasing prestige by these accomplishments that it has threatened to discredit the Hebraic component more and more, relegating its characteristic insights to outmoded “superstitions” at the precise moment in history in which its insights would be most serviceable in understanding man’s history; and the more consistently a proud Hellenic culture tended to misinterpret that tragic drama, the more its philosophies and sciences became “empirical” and more intent upon the “facts.”

Christianity is commonly believed to be a joint product of Hebraic and Hellenic cultures. This is true only in the sense that, beginning with the Johannine literature in the Bible, it sought to come to terms with the Greek concept of the permanent structure in things, and has embodied in its own life the permanent tension between the Greek and the Hebraic ways of apprehending reality. But this does not change the fact that when it is true to itself, it is Hebraic rather than Hellenic. It believes in a personal God despite the embarrassment of its philosophers. It has, as Judaism, the other religion of the Bible, the sense of a covenant community based on commitments and memories of past revelations; and it relies on these historic revelations to penetrate the divine mystery rather than upon an analysis of the permanent or “eternal” structures through which the temporal events flow. It is therefore Hebraic rather than Hellenic in its essence, even though in popular piety the Greek idea of the immortality of the soul has usurped the Hebraic idea of the “resurrection of the body.” This usurpation is significant because the idea of the resurrection clearly implies the finiteness of historical man and the wholeness of the person in his finiteness and freedom. That there should be a transmutation of that person “in the resurrection” can clearly only be held “by faith.” On the other hand, it is supposedly more rational to believe that an immortal soul flees from a mortal body upon death. It may seem a more rational belief, but it rests upon a very dubious distinction between an immortal “mind” and a mortal body. This distinction is the key to the Greek understanding of the self.

The sharpness of the contrast between Hellenic and Hebraic ways of knowing must not obscure the similarity of their origins. Both cultures began with a poetic-dramatic apprehension of historic reality, which was probably not so different from the poetic ways of knowing in all early cultures and analyzed so perceptively in Henri Frankfort’s Intellectual Adventure of Ancient Man. The similarity was preserved beyond the primitive beginning of the cultures and was apparent in the period when a developing reason and imagination refined the early myths. For this refinement in the Hebrew prophets and the Greek dramatists was remarkably similar in ethos. The dramatis personae of Greek drama were real persons engaged in actual history, subject to conflicting claims upon their consciences which were not easily resolved. They were actuated by compulsions which were derived from their thymos rather than from the lusts of the body to which the philosophers attributed all non-rational compulsions.

The persons in Greek drama were not under the illusion that they could bring all the vitalities of life and history into a neat order if only the subrational impulses were subordinated to the order of “mind.” These persons were men of spirit, who were betrayed into evil by the same capacity which made their creativity possible: their freedom over natural impulses. The Dionysian impulses may have been at war with the Apollonian sense of order in Greek tragedy. But there is no suggestion of a war between the mind and the body. That division was introduced by the philosophers.

The idea of an inner conflict in man does, however, introduce the first real difference between the Greek and the Hebraic analysis of the human situation. The Promethean theme in Greek tragedy and the myth of the Fall in the Bible both deal with the inclination of man to defy the limits set for him as a creature. But they arrive at different answers of the problem.

Both in the “Fall” myth in the Bible and in the Promethean theme in Greek drama this tendency, defined as hybris or pride, is regarded as the root of evil rather than the subrational impulses of nature But in the Promethean theme, Zeus is regarded as motivated by an unjustified jealousy against the creativity of man or against Prometheus, the quasi-divine protagonist of man. Prometheus is responsible for giving man all the arts of civilization. It is, in short, not possible to exploit all the capacities of man and establish civilization without violating Zeus’ rather unjustified restraints upon those capacities. It is unnecessary to say that Zeus is the forerunner of the principle of order which Greek ontology exalts as the rational basis of existence. In the “Fall” myth it is not regarded as inevitable that man offend God in his creativity. God sets limits for finite man; but those limits do not exclude his dominion over nature and all that this dominion implies. God is, in short, much higher than either the order of nature or some principle of rational coherence. He is “transcendent” to any conceivable order; but He reminds man that there are limits which he must not exceed. Man*s sin consists in a pride which pretends to defy those limits. Human creativity has much wider scope than in Greek tragedy. Therefore the Old Testament does not reveal the ambivalence between Zeus and Prometheus of Greek tragedy. God is not unjustifiedly jealous; and the defiance of God is not the tragic prerequisite of man’s creativity. The myth of the “Fall” obviously derives from an interpretation of the human situation, first elaborated by the great prophets of Israel. Both this and the Greek dramatists’ interpretation are poetic and dramatic; not ontological. But the Hebraic frame of meaning is superior because the principle of meaning is placed in a position of transcendence over the actual structures of existence. Therefore the whole scope of human striving does not inevitably violate the principle of order in human existence. This is the first clearly stated difference between the Greek and Hebraic modes of “knowing” God. It is the beginning of what finally becomes a clear distinction between an “immanent” and “transcendent” God. This distinction also involves the derivative distinction between the immanent and the transcendent human self. Throughout the course of Western history men found the facts of selfhood to correspond to the symbol of transcendence. But they never ceased to be apologetic for the “irrational” symbol of the transcendence of both God and man, in their embarrassment, partly occasioned by the spatial implications in the symbol of transcendence, and partly by the fact that transcendence could not be fitted into a system of rational coherence, they violated all the “facts” of experience in order to achieve the “rationality” of divine or human immanence. One side of our culture, and significantly that side which was proudest of its “culture” took the superiority of Greek monism for granted and regarded even the most rigorous prophetic monotheism as a slightly cruder form of the monotheism which the Greek philosophers achieved.

From the sixth century, when Xenophanes first seriously challenged the anthropomorphic Gods of Homeric legend and constructed a rigorous rationalistic monism or monotheism to the flowering of Greek philosophy in the thought of Plato and Aristotle, the Greeks were agreed in the proposition stated by Plato that nous, or mind, was “king of heaven and earth”; that the rational principle of order, immanent in the variegated structures and “natures” of existence, was really God. And since that time almost every philosopher, even Christian ones, have celebrated this Greek emancipation from both parochialism and anthropomorphism. In comparison with this achievement the faith of the prophets of Israel seemed less impressive. Did not their God exhibit anthropomorphic traits? Did He not manifest love and hate and all the passions of a finite self? Histories of culture had to do some justice to the Hebraic side of our culture. But the average historian could not bring himself to any judgement fairer than that of Hegel, who regarded the Biblical faith as a crude and picturesque form of poetic thinking which, in every case and every age, philosophy had to refine. The prophets arrived at their truth “by revelation and authority” in the words of Gilbert Highet1 and their God was, though one and not many, still irrationally “transcendent.” The prophetic achievement could not compare with that of the philosophers who had achieved a conception of God thoroughly “immanent” in the world*s processes and established as a certainty by the most rigorous rational disciplines.

There is, in fact, a rather rapid descent from the appreciation of the “existing individual” in Greek drama to the loss of the individual in the ontological systems of Greek philosophy. The individual is partly known and partly obscured in Socrates’ thought. His dialogic procedure, his emphasis upon the maxim “know thyself,” his belief that his conscience was “a little God” with which he conversed — all revealed an awareness of the realities of the inner and outer dialogue in which the self is engaged. In Plato this residual understanding is partly obscured by his elaboration of the dictum of Socrates that “men would do the good if they only know it.” The supremacy of the mind and its identification with the self is established. The Eros doctrine of Plato however is a qualification on the later mind-body dualism. For it assumes that the mind has the task not only of suppressing and ordering the physical impulses of the self, but of transmuting the “spirited” element of the self beyond its immediate goals to the ultimate ones. Thus the idea of “intellectual Eros” is elaborated. It does not, of course, change the essential contempt of the body in Greek dualism. Those who “take themselves to women and beget children” are regarded as engaged in a lower enterprise than those who harness thymos to the search for “truth, beauty and goodness.” These insights into the complexities of the self*s creativities are more consistently obscured in the rationalism of Aristotle. He excludes self-knowledge specifically from the competence of the mind, acknowledges that the mind is involved in the body, but insists that pure mind is impersonal and universal. It is, as it were, provisionally imprisoned in the body. It is the “form of forms” and therefore the principle of meaning for all sensible things in their structures and forms. Thus the inconvenient self is dissipated into mind; and mind into the structures of existence.

The identification of mind or nous with God and the belief that the rational order is really the creative principle of life is succinctly and religiously expressed in the words of Anaxagoras: “Everything else has a share of everything. Nous, however, is infinite and self-ruling and is mixed with nothing, but is alone itself by itself. For if it were not by itself but mixed with something else, it would not share in all things, it would not have a share in all things if it were mixed with any. . . .Mind arranged all such things as were to be and were (that is things which now are not) and such as are present; and it arranged this whirling, too, which the stars and the sun and the moon and the air and the ether — as they separate off — perform.” Thus did the Greek mind identify meaning with rational intelligibility and state its confidence in the power of reason, which remains a strong motif in our culture and expresses itself in even such strong and Aristotelian philosophers as John Dewey.

Rationalists of all ages of Western history have regarded the rigorous monotheism of the Hebraic prophets as inferior to this philosophical monism. But they did not observe that the God of the prophets convicted all particular forces in history, including the “elect” nation and its “rulers” and “princes,” of violating the divine command of justice while the Greek philosophers were complacent about the social realities of the Greek city-state and lived under the illusion that the rulers were the instruments of justice because they possessed a higher measure of mind, in short, the contingent character of all social achievements was discerned by prophetism and obscured by even the most sophisticated Greek philosophy. The God of the prophets made judgements which left even the elect nation uneasy. The God of Aristotle was a universal mind with which the mind of the philosopher claimed a complacent identity. So the tension between the finite self and the divine self was obscured.

The contrast between the two forms of monotheism was revealed even more clearly in their attitudes toward the “rulers” of their respective civilizations. The prophets were severely critical of the rulers or “elders” of Israel. Their criticism was directed at their pride and injustice. (“They turn aside the needy at the gate,” declared Amos; and Isaiah charged that of the poor is in their houses.) This happened to be an accurate description of the actual behavior of ruling groups throughout the ages.

In contract we have both Plato’s and Aristotle’s complacent acceptance of the aristocratic structure of Hellenic society, and Aristotle’s conviction that some men were “by nature'” slaves. The basis of this conviction was clearly their confidence in the “reason” of the “guardians” as a source of justice and as the agent of order in the polis. Ignorant men would strive for immediate ends, but the “philosophers” would with superior intelligence strive for more inclusive ends and thus create a political order which would imitate the cosmic order created by the divine mind. The provisional truth in this assessment of the human situation lies in the fact that some men excel others in the rational comprehension of the forces and factors which are involved in any political situation. These are the potential rulers in a community. But their superior rational endowment guarantees nothing in regard to the justice with which they will wield their power or exercise their eminence. The basic fallacy of the Greek philosophers was to regard the rational faculty as the source of virtue. This error was partly due to their failure to recognize the ability of the self to use its reason for its own ends. It was partly due to the inclination to find in the sub-rational impulses the cause of confusion and egoism in human behavior. This error was to be repeated again and again in the history of Western thought. It has made the whole Greek tradition inferior in the understanding of human nature to the Hebraic one. Nevertheless the Greek tradition is still preferred to the Hebraic because it displays a neater coherence of the world of the self and the world, and of the self and God. For the world, the self and God are all contained within the continuities of “reason.”

The Hebraic tradition, which is allegedly more crude and less rational, is still relegated to the sphere of “pre-scientific” or “pre-philosophical” thought. It is, despite these prejudices, more “empirical” than the Greek tradition. Its superior empirical accuracy consists in its understanding of the wholeness of the human self in body, mind and soul, in the appreciation of the dramatic variety of the self’s encounters with other selves in history, and in the discontinuity between the self and God. The self feels itself in dialogue with God. In this dialogue, God is not the “wholly other”; but he is certainly the divine other.

The self is not related to God by sharing its reason with God and finding a point of identity with the divine through the rational faculty. The self is related to God in repentance, faith and commitment. All these forms of relation imply a certain degree of existential discontinuity with God. The self is always a creature, conscious of its finiteness, and equally conscious of its pretension in not admitting its finiteness. Insofar as it becomes conscious of its pretensions it is capable of repentance and a new life. The encounter with God is in short a dramatic one. The personal encounter takes place in the context of a framework of meaning defined by a collective encounter between God and His people. The prophets speak to Israel, and finally to individuals in Israel (particularly in the case of Jeremiah and Ezekiel) on the basis of the assumption that God has a covenant with Israel. This covenant is at once the presupposition and the fruit of prophetic inspiration. The Covenant of God with Israel is an article of faith. It is not altogether clear whether it was Moses or Abraham who was the human agent of the covenant. This indicates either a confusion in the tradition or perhaps the collation of two traditions, perhaps stemming respectively from Palestinian and Egyptian sources. But the confusion does not prevent the gradual consolidation of the idea of the covenant and its service as the ground upon which prophetic thought proceeds. The circular movement between the presupposition of prophetic thought and its consequence will disturb the rationalists. There is a perfect analogy in the thought of the early Church about the “second Covenant” in Christ. For the “Christ event” is at once the presupposition of the faith of the early Church and the consequence of the increasing confidence of this community of faith that the drama of the Christ event which was the basis of its life disclosed both the kernel of meaning in the mystery of the divine and provided a norm for the life of man. Both were comprehended in the agape of Christ.

Prophetic consciousness assumed a covenant between a God, “who laid the foundations of the earth,” — a God who did not depend for His prestige upon the victory of a nation, who was sovereign of both nature and history; — and a particular people. The Covenant is involved in the same scandal of Einmaligkeit as is the later Christian revelation. A particular event in history is believed to be the clue to the mystery of the divine majesty, which is sovereign over all of history. In the modern mind (and for that matter the classical mind) such revelations are identified with theophanies which the credulous believe and the intelligent reject while they look for the ultimate in either a principle of rational order in the world or in a mystery which annuls all historic purposes and meanings.

But meanwhile the prophets gave ample testimony of the fact that they were in encounter with the “true” God rather than the idols of human imagination. From that encounter they returned to preach judgement upon the “elect” but rebellious nation. They warned against the prophets “that make you vain. They speak a vision of their own heart and not out of the mouth of the Lord.” They proved the falsity of their imaginings, these false prophets, by increasing the complacency of the human heart, intent upon its own ends: “They say still unto them that despise me, ‘the Lord hath said you shall have peace’; and they say unto every one who walketh after the imagination of his own heart, no evil shall come unto you.” (Jeremiah 23:17) The prophets did not engage in the fruitless debate whether “religion,” or “reason,” was most serviceable in eliminating human vanity. They knew very well that the religion of false prophets accentuated human vanity and pretension. “Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord,” Jeremiah continues, “Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord. I have heard what the prophets said, that prophesy lies in my name, saying, I have dreamed, I have dreamed. . .The prophet that hath a dream, let him tell a dream; and he that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully.” (Jeremiah 23:24-28) It might be observed that rational discrimination is undoubtedly a resource in distinguishing religious visions which are in the service of human pretension and the “word of the Lord” which punctures all human vanities. But it must also be apparent that the prophets had no difficulty in distinguishing between a genuine word of the Lord, which was “sharper than a two- edged sword,” and the “dreams” and “imaginations” of the false prophets. The latter always accentuated human complacency and pretension.

It was left to a later Alexandrian Jew, Philo, anxious to make the prophetic tradition acceptable to the Greek world, to interpret the prophetic encounter with God as “ecstatic,” which is to say, as consisting of precisely those “imaginations” which the prophets defined as the marks of the “false prophets.” For the Greek culture could understand “ecstasy” as the visions of men who were “beyond themselves”; and it might even make religious ecstasy more tolerable by purging it of caprice and identifying it with mystic efforts of the self to escape from itself. Thus the effort to make the scandal of prophetic consciousness acceptable to the Greek mind robbed it of its genius.3

The community of the covenant was maintained, on the one hand, by prophetic interpretations of the Covenant, which had the effect of increasing the sense of the significance of the Covenant and of purging the Covenant people of any false pride and security because of their “elect” status. It was preserved, on the other hand, by memories of critical historic events by which the people were separated out and became a “peculiar” people, part nation and part church. The force of these historic memories, refreshed by liturgical observances year by year (most of which were festival of nature religions transmuted into historical anniversaries) — the force of these memories has been powerful enough to preserve the self-identity of a nation through the centuries, though it has lacked a “homeland” and lived in the “diaspora” for many centuries until very recently. The other means of survival has been the observance of the Torah, the law, about which a Christian can not speak sympathetically because one of the reasons for the emergence of a “new Covenant” was precisely the problem of the adequacy of the law as a mediator between man and God in the final encounter. It is possible only to say as one who stands by religious commitment outside this Covenant, that the religious consciousness of the Jews is determined from the beginning by two strains, legalistic and prophetic, which were expressed in the very idea of the covenant. For it was the Sovereign of history (“I am the Lord thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt”) who also enjoined the precepts of the Decalogue which follows that introduction. For the Christian it would seem that the “new covenant” is the fulfillment of the prophetic consciousness about God, man and history and the negation of the legalistic interpretation. But he must certainly guard against the misinterpretations which have contrasted the New Testament as containing a “religion of the Spirit” with the Old Testament, as a “religion of the ‘law.’” Certainly, despite the ages of post-exilic legalism in Judaism, the prophetic-dramatic-historical genius of prophetism was sufficiently vital in Judaism to produce two thinkers, Franz Rosenzweig and Martin Buber, in our own generation, who perceived the realities of both human and divine “selfhood” and of the dramatic character of history more acutely than any Christian theologian.

Furthermore, if Jewish legalism proved as inadequate as Christian obscurantism in dealing with “modern” situations and the modern man’s quest for rational understanding of his world, both survived in an unfavorable environment because their approach to the mystery and meaning of the self and of God, and of the reality of human history, made their “foolishness” a source of wisdom. It might be necessary to cherish this wisdom in a corner but it was cherished nevertheless by men who knew themselves to be selves and to be in encounter with God, in ages in which this dimension of human existence was denied. The fact that such men as Spinoza and Freud, not to speak of Philo, were Jews, and that Maimonides was as anxious in the medieval period to conform Judaism to Aristotle’s wisdom as Aquinas was to conform Christianity, merely proves how difficult it was to appreciate the peculiar genius of one’s own culture and faith in ages in which everything tended to make that faith seem to be primitive and picturesque but not rationally respectable.

NOTES:
1. Man’s Unconquerable Mind.
2. Werner W. Jaeger: Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers, p. 160, Oxford University Press.
3. Cf. Abraham Heschel: Die Prophetic (shortly to be had in English translation).

Reference
http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=490&C=417

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